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Abstract: Fertility rates around the world are falling at the same time that male-skewed sex ratios at birth are on the 
rise. The individual fertility choices people make contribute to this inverse relationship, exacerbating the problem of 
“missing women” as well as a number of other adverse social and economic effects. The decision to have a child is 
extremely complex. Distilling the interaction between fertility and sex compositional preferences, fertility levels, and 
gender norms is an important step toward understanding both the reproductive choices people make as well as the 
formation of fertility preferences. I use individual-level data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) over 
the period from 1984 through 2018 to perform empirical analysis on the fertility preferences of women and men from 
over 75 countries. I exploit the exogenous sex of firstborn children and the timing of the DHS survey to explore the 
marginal effect of having a recently firstborn son or daughter on preferences for total fertility, as well as preferred 
numbers of sons and daughters. I then test two existing theories how on the sex of existing children influences parity 
progression: that the sex of existing children matters more in low fertility regimes in explaining subsequent births, 
and that the sex of children will matter more in places with less egalitarian gender norms. Analysis suggests that the 
sex of firstborn children plays a role in how fertility preferences update. The strongest preference changes are for 
ideal number of daughters, although total fertility also change dependent on the sex of one’s firstborn. Finally, I find 
evidence to support the theory that fertility regimes and gender norms play a role in determining preference updates.  
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1.  Introduction 
Over the course of the past half-century, demographic transitions around the world have caused 
the average of number of children born per woman to fall from over five to less than two and a 
half. The dwindling global fertility rate is driven largely by developing countries, indicating a rise 
in individual- and family-level reproductive agency in these countries. Prior to this demographic 
shift, fertility decisions were largely made at a group level (Reher et al. 2017). Before the 
technological advancements that allowed infant and child mortality to fall and human life spans 
to increase, high rates of fertility were necessary to ensure society’s survival. These technological 
advancements have allowed individual families to gain increased agency over reproductive 
choices and circumstances. European birth records from the late 1800s and early 1900s suggest 
that couples made, and reevaluated, fertility goals based off of their changing reproductive 
circumstances (Hank 2007; Reher et al. 2017). During a time when infant and child mortality was 
in decline, the somewhat unlikely event of a child’s death often triggered a replacement birth. 
Additional evidence of reproductive goals includes the findings that many families with all female 
sibship sets continued having children until the birth of a son (Gray & Evans 2004; Reher et al. 
2017).  
 This phenomenon, known as son-based stopping, can be observed in the reproductive 
outcomes of societies and individuals around the world (Gray & Evans 2004; Reher et al. 2017; 
Basu & De Jong, 2010; Reher et al. 2017; Yamaguchi 1989). Son-based stopping is an effect of the 
preference for male children that is pervasive, to some extent, in most societies. Many social, 
psychosocial, economic, and religious mechanism lie behind son-preference: sons inherit land, 
carry on family names and bloodlines, elevate the social status of mothers, care for aging parents, 
take on significant roles in certain religious practices, and more (Das Gupta et al. 2003; Giuliano 
2017; Hank 2007; Jayachandran 2015). Daughters also carry their own set of parental utilities, 
often in their ability to care for younger siblings and help with household tasks. However, parents 
of daughters also have to worry about the potential costs of dowries and weddings, as well as the 
additional anxiety of sexual violence being more prevalent against daughters. (Hank 2007; Puri et 
al. 2011).  
 Individuals weigh these and other considerations and constraints, including their 
personal fertility preferences, when developing their reproductive goals and preferences in terms 
of the number of children they want and the sex composition of those children. Thanks to modern 
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technology, couples who possess the means and the inclination can exercise complete control 
over the sex of their children with sex-selective technologies such as ultrasounds, selective 
abortions, sperm sorting, and pre-implantation sex technologies (Jayachandran 2017; Puri et al. 
2011). Parents, on average, also want fewer children than ever before. When it comes to ensuring 
the birth of a son, many parents are not willing to leave it up to chance. Lower levels of total 
fertility mean that families with a strong desire for at least one son are more likely to sex-select 
by way of abortion, infanticide, or neglect. The relationship between the falling fertility rate and 
the availability of sex-selective technologies has led to a rising inequality in the observed sex-ratio 
at birth (SRB) since the 1980s (Basu 1999; Das Gupta & Bhat 1997; Jayachandran 2017; Park & 
Cho 1995). 
According to the WHO, the “natural” SRB falls between 103 to 107 males born for every 
100 females. Many countries, notably China, India, Vietnam, and Pakistan, have SRBs exceeding 
110 (Roser & Richie 2020). When breaking down SRB by birth order, research shows that even 
in countries with a strong son-bias, the SRB of firstborn children falls into this “natural” range. It 
begins to diverge sharply with second children in these regions, especially if a couple’s first child 
was a daughter (Anukriti et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 1993). Empirical research shows that parents most 
commonly want at least one child of either sex and suggests that sex selection is unlikely to be 
utilized for lower parity children where the main decision seems to be whether or not have a child 
(Bhalotra & Cochrane 2010; Hank 2007).  
 Taken together, the individual reproductive choices of people around the world have 
greatly contributed to the phenomena of “missing women” (Sen 1990). Overwhelmingly these 
missing women are from a subset of developing countries where sex ratios at birth (SRBs) are 
heavily skewed toward male children through means such as son-based stopping, sex-selective 
abortions, daughter-discriminatory prenatal health decisions, and female infanticide. Due to its 
striking humanitarian and societal implications, the issue of missing women has received a great 
deal of attention over the past three decades from researchers, policy makers, and governments 
alike. Despite making strides in numerous areas of social and economic development, countries 
with strong son-preference have SRBs that continue to rise sex-selective technologies become 
more widely available and as total fertility rates fall. As of 2010, 126 million women were missing 
due to sex-selection and excess mortality at birth. This number is expected to rise to 150 million 
by 2035 (Bongaarts & Guilmoto 2015). As sex-selection technologies become more prevalent, it 
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becomes imperative to understand the individual preferences behind sex-imbalances and what 
can potentially alter these preferences.   
There are two existing theories as to how the sex of children influence parity progression. 
The first is that the sex of existing children will matter more in low fertility regimes in explaining 
subsequent births. The second is that the sex of children will matter more in places with more 
unequal gender norms (Gray & Evans 2004; Hank 2007; Pollard & Morgan 2002). The strength 
of my research lies in the opportunity to observe how fertility preferences update in response to 
the sex of firstborn children, and how differential fertility regimes and cultural gender norms play 
a role in the ways that these preferences change. Becoming a parent marks a distinct change to 
anyone’s life no matter their cultural context or motivations. For a number of intrinsic and 
extrinsic reasons, it is a reasonable assumption that the realities of birthing and caring for a child 
may cause individuals to reevaluate their reproductive goals and fertility preferences. 
Additionally, the exogenous sex of one’s firstborn child is likely to factor into how these 
preferences are updated as substitutability of daughters and sons is highly dependent upon 
cultural gender norms. 
 My study is unique in using the plausibly exogenous variation in the sex of recently 
firstborn children to understand how the sex outcome of a birth changes preferences for total 
fertility and family composition. To my knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the effects of 
sex outcome of first birth on fertility preferences. I investigate changes in stated preferences for 
total number of children, and number of preferred sons and daughters, based upon the sex of an 
individual’s recently firstborn child. I also test the two existing hypotheses about sex of children 
influencing parity progression by examining the ways in which country-level socio-cultural 
effects such as fertility and gender norms cause these preferences to differ. The rest of my paper 
is laid out as follows: Section 2 offers a review of relevant literature and the theoretical framework 
of paper, Section 3 includes information on my data sources and methodology, Section 4 discusses 
findings and robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
A robust body of literature shows that fertility preferences, and subsequently reproductive 
choices, are closely tied to cultural gender norms, which are themselves a subset of social norms. 
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In this section I discuss the threads of economic literature that form the theoretical framework 
and empirical backbone of my research.  
 
2.1   The Evolution & Perpetuation of Social Norms  
Because social norms are central to economic relationships, there is a robust body of economic 
literature on the subject. Many economic theorists have turned to evolutionary game theory to 
explore how social norms evolve and shift over time (Bowles 2004; Boyd & Richerson 2002, 
Young 1993, 2015). Several important aspects influence the ways in which norms develop. Firstly, 
they can positively self-reinforce at the group level. Secondly, they can mutate organically via 
experimentation. Finally, they can diverge across time and space. Meanwhile, a number of 
mechanisms enforce normative behavior including social pressure, coordination, signaling, and 
reference points (Boyd & Richerson 2002; Montgomery & Casterline 1996; Young 1993, 2015).  
Two concepts, persistence and tipping, are crucial to the evolution of norms over time. 
Persistence refers to the fact that norms respond slowly to external conditions that may alter the 
costs and benefits of adherence. However, once a competitive new norm gains a foothold within 
a group the shift usually happens very suddenly, not slowly over time. Once this tipping point is 
reached, positive reinforcement and increased payoffs hasten the transition (Young 2015). Young 
(1993) calls the interaction of these two concepts as the punctuated equilibrium effect. He writes that 
these two effects “create a characteristic signature in the historical evolution of norms: there are 
long periods of no change punctuated by occasional bursts of activity in which an old norm is 
rapidly displaced by a new one” (Young 2015).   
In a study on innovation diffusion, Young (2009) presents three norm diffusion models: 
contagion, social influence, and social learning. Contagion models show people adopting when 
they come into contact with others who have adopted, much like a virus. Social influence models 
see people adopting once enough other people in their group have adopted in a show of 
conformity. In social learning models, people adopt only after they have been convinced that the 
norm is worth adopting; after they have seen the beneficial outcomes of prior adopters. Social 
learning is the most prominent model of norm diffusion within the economic discipline as it is 
based upon utility maximization. Using an empirical study on the adoption of corn farming, 
Young concludes that it provides evidence that social learning is the most realistic of the three 
models (Young 2009).   
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Prior to the formal institutional enforcement of rules by the likes of a state, society used 
norms to regulate social order. Norms could spread easily across neighboring groups and were 
likely to be adopted and reinforced if they were beneficial to the group as a whole. Using a 
standard replicator model of evolutionary game theory, Boyd and Richerson (2002) show that 
group beneficial norms spread quickly in a spatially structured population as a result of the ready 
adoption of strategies with high average payoffs. Using the social learning model defined by 
Young, their simulation shows individuals interacting repeatedly within their own society and 
sometimes with neighboring groups. Individuals have a higher probability of adopting a strategy 
from a neighboring group if that strategy yields a high payoff. Likewise, individuals within one’s 
own society will similarly adopt that trait if it yields higher payoffs than their current strategy. 
Individuals interact more often with others from their own society than from neighboring 
societies, hence a norm will be adapted faster within-society than across societies (Boyd and 
Richerson 2002).  
Preferences, like social norms, emerge from individuals interacting with their environment 
and change in response to social learning and adaptation (Druckman & Lupia 2000; Young 2015; 
Wildavsky 1987). Druckman and Lupia (2000) discuss preferences as ranked sets of substitutable 
choices, with preferences serving as cognitive markers that people store in their memory and draw 
upon when making decisions. Preferences are ranked using comparative evaluations that draw on 
information at hand, belief systems, social norms, and reference groups. 
Of course, not all groups are heterogeneous. Modern societies are increasingly made up of 
individuals with diverse cultural histories. Bisin and Verdier (2001) present a model explaining 
the persistence of culturally specific norms. In order to explore the dynamics of preferences and 
cultural transmission, the authors construct a model in which parents judge their children’s 
actions and behaviors in accordance with their own preferences, therefore children are socialized 
in accordance with the preferences preferred by the parents. Because children are socialized 
primarily within the family unit and secondarily within their surrounding culture, parents will 
spend more resources directly socializing children in a culture where they are minority members. 
In a society where the family is a member of the majority, the family trusts the culture as a whole 
to socialize the child in their way of thinking and the parents will take on a more passive role. 
However, in a culture where the family is a minority the parents do not trust the majority culture 
and will expend effort to directly influence their children’s preferences (Bisin and Verdier 2002).    
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2.2   The Formation of Gender Norms  
Boserup (1970) theorized that cultural differences in economic development stem from male and 
female farming systems and the division of labor within agriculture. Boserup compared areas in 
Africa that historically practiced shifting cultivation with regions in Asia that predominantly 
used plough cultivation. She proposed a theory that normative divisions of labor resulted from a 
culture’s agricultural practices. Shifting cultivation requires working a smaller tract of land with 
hand tools where families grow crops on a tract for a few years before clearing a new plot of land 
and beginning again with fresh soil. The use of small hand tools was suited for female labor, 
whereas men in these societies specialized in activities that required physical strength, such as 
felling trees and hunting game. In contrast to shifting cultivation, plough cultivation requires 
large draft animals and substantial physical strength to control both the animal and the plough 
itself. In plough regions, families cultivated larger tracts of land year after year. More overall food 
per family was required due to both fewer families engaging in agriculture, as well as the feed 
required for large draft animals. In these areas, men specialized in agriculture as a result of their 
greater relative upper body strength, making women’s labor unessential to field work. This led to 
women focusing on tasks based within the confines of the home. Boserup believed that the 
historical roles of men and women within the household and agricultural spheres, respectively, 
inform attitudes toward work and gender roles today (Boserup 1970).   
   In a 2013 empirical study, Alesina et al. put Boserup’s plough hypothesis to the test. They 
find evidence showing the descendants of ethnic groups that practiced plough-based agriculture 
have lower rates of female labor force participation and more unequal beliefs about gender norms 
than the descendants of their shifting-based agricultural counterparts (Alesina et al., 2013). Their 
findings are consistent with Boserup’s hypothesis that agricultural traditions and the gendered 
divisions of labor they inspired informed cultural norms regarding the role of women and men in 
society.   
Subsequent work by other economists has added to the body of empirical evidence 
supporting Boserup’s hypothesis linking historical divisions of labor with current gendered social 
norms. Hansen et al. (2015) show that cultures with a longer history of agriculture have more 
patriarchal views towards gender roles. The authors believe that one mechanism behind their 
findings is a result of Malthusian dynamics: societies that have practiced agriculture for longer 
are more technologically advanced, which translated to higher overall fertility during the pre-
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industrial era, and women therefore spending more time and effort childrearing. A second 
mechanism is that societies that have practiced agriculture for longer are more likely to farm 
cereals. Cereals require processing, a task that women have comparative advantage in as it 
interferes less with childcare (Hansen et al. 2015).   
Researchers have connected more egalitarian gender norms to regions where women 
contributed directly to the subsistence of the home through activities such as farming or fishing. 
In these regions, the shadow value placed on women’s labor can be gleaned by looking at the 
direction bridal wealth flows: bride prices (money or gifts given to a bride’s family) tend to be 
practiced in areas with shifting agriculture, whereas dowries (money or gifts given to the groom’s 
family) are more commonly seen in regions with plough-based agriculture (Boserup 1970; 
Guiliano 2017). Research shows that modern SRBs are more uneven in countries with a history of 
plough-based agriculture, indicating a preference for sons. Historical birthing records also show 
evidence of son-preference in these regions in the common occurrence of son-based stopping 
(Alesina, et al. 2018; Jayachandran 2017; Krause et al. 2019).   
 
2.3   Fertility Preferences, Reproductive Choices & Sex Ratios at Birth  
Fertility behavior and demographics have been studied by economists since the discipline’s early 
days. Thomas Malthus (1798) observed dynamics known as a Malthusian Trap, in which population 
levels were kept in check by scarce resources. Population levels could grow if resources became 
more abundant, but the growing population would return per capita resource levels to the same 
steady state and thus remain trapped (Malthus 1798). Soon after, the beginning of the industrial 
revolution created a whole new set of population dynamics – forever changing the way humans 
make reproductive choices.  
 The industrial revolution ushered in exponential rates of capital accumulation, and with 
it the beginning of the first of many demographic transitions to take place around the world. It 
was during this era that reproductive agency shifted from group-level to family-level. As per 
capita income grew and medical advances caused a steep decline in rates of child mortality, people 
were able to make and keep reproductive goals with a new level of certainty. In these newly 
industrializing countries, the death of a child went from being something every couple expected 
to endure at least once to a relative rarity over the course of the late 1800s and early 1900s (Reher 
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et al. 2017). Throughout the 1900s this transition continued to take place in countries around the 
world, with many less developed regions still in the midst their demographic transitions.  
 As countries’ economies developed over the course of the 20th and 21st century, couples 
went from having over five children on average to less than two and a half (UN 2019). Many 
economists and demographers have studied the lower fertility levels that characterize the latter 
half of demographic transitions. Multiple mechanisms are theorized to be the driving force behind 
these changes, including declining rates of child mortality, higher rates of contraceptive access 
and use, increases in women’s education and workforce participation, and couples waiting longer 
to have children or deciding to forego having children completely (Becker 1960; Guinnane 2011; 
Shultz 1973; Vogl 2013).  
Gary Becker (1960) looked at the choices individual sets of parents must make when 
having children, reasoning that children are a type of consumer durable from which parents derive 
satisfaction. Individual families must determine not only how many children to have but how 
much to spend on each child. Demand for most consumer durables rises in both quality and 
quantity with income. Certain aspects of modernity, such as declining infant mortality and the 
availability of reliable birth control, mean that parents can control the number of children they 
have while being reasonably sure of the survival of those children. As incomes rise, parents often 
choose to have fewer children of increasingly high quality in terms of child health and education 
(Becker 1960; Becker & Lewis 1973).  
Meanwhile, Galor and Weil (2005) present a macro-focused theory known as the unified 
growth model in which parents invest more resources in fewer children as technological growth 
progresses. They theorized that technology increases the returns to children’s education, inducing 
parents to choose to educate their children and creating a feedback loop which increases 
technological progress, human capital, and income per capita (Galor & Weil, 2005).  
Shultz (1973) likewise examines the fertility choices available to an individual household 
and considers the price of children with respect to both the human capital required to raise them, 
as well as the formation of children into human capital. Shultz uses a household production 
function where the bearing and raising of children is a decision made in accordance with other 
consumption and production decisions. In his view, children first take away from and then add to 
human capital in a household. Young children are labor-intensive, the cost of which is largely 
absorbed by women. As children grow, they become less costly in terms of labor and more costly 
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in terms of consumption, including educational and leisure costs. However, older children also 
have the possibility of adding to family capital if they assist in production (Shultz, 1973).  
In addition to economic utility, some combination of personal and social motivations lies 
behind people’s decision to have a child. Personal motivations include a sense of identity, morality, 
creativity, or accomplishment. Meanwhile, social motivations include strengthening group ties, 
social status, or a sense of social comparison and/or competition (Gray & Evans 2004; Hoffman 
1975). Hoffman (1975) theorizes that parenthood establishes an individual as a stable, mature, and 
acceptable member of a community in a way that little else does. She argues that this is 
particularly true for mothers of lower socio-economic status who have a harder time attaining 
status through means more available to men such as education and employment. Additionally, 
many cultures view motherhood as women’s major role in life (Hoffman 1975).   
Both Shultz and Becker developed models in which households make fertility decisions as 
a unit. In these unitary household models, decisions are made either by a dictator-like head of the 
household or through a consensus on the part of household members (Samuelson 1956; Becker 
1973). However, more recent empirical studies on household decision-making show that the 
unitary model of the household is unrealistic, as households are made up of individuals who 
sometimes have conflicting preferences (Ashraf et al 2014; Duflo 2001; Thomas 1990; Qian 2008).   
  In empirical studies of household consumption decisions, economists found diverging 
preferences of husbands and wives on a number of different matters. A Zambia-based RCT gave 
either couples or individual women vouchers for free injectable birth control. Couples given 
access to the voucher were 19% less likely to ultimately use the birth control and 27% more likely 
to give birth than when women were privately offered vouchers individually (Ashraf et al. 2014). 
Duflo (2001) found that old-age pensions received by grandmothers as opposed to grandfathers 
resulted in granddaughters with 1.19 standard deviations improved weight-given-height and 1.16 
standard deviations improved height-given-age than girls born before the pensions policies took 
effect. No significant changes were found for grandsons from either grandparent receiving the 
pension (Duflo 2001). A study in China found female children have higher survival rates and 
receive more education when women’s incomes rise relative to men’s (Qian 2008). Similarly, a 
study in Brazil found that when women’s unearned incomes rise, women spend more on their 
daughters and when men’s unearned incomes rise, they spend more money on their sons (Thomas, 
1990). These findings reinforce the non-unitary model of household decision-making and suggest 
that men and women have different priorities when making consumption decisions.  The results 
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also show that women prioritize spending on their daughters (and granddaughters) more than 
men, implying some degree of daughter-preference on the part of women.   
According to the WHO, in the absence of explicit discrimination against daughters – 
including sex-selective abortions, daughter-discriminatory prenatal health decisions, and female 
infanticide, the “natural” SRB falls between 103 to 107 males born for every 100 females. However, 
many countries exhibit SRBs well over the “natural” range – most of which are countries whose 
decedents practiced plough-based agriculture (Krause et al. 2019). China, India, and South Korea 
are three such countries with extreme male skewed SRBs. In a cross-cultural analysis, Das Gupta 
et al. (2003) argue that son-preference in these countries stems from rigidly patrilineal kinship 
systems that marginalize women, guaranteeing that parents have few economic incentives to raise 
daughters. This results in strong pressure, both socially and economically, to bear sons (Das 
Gupta et al. 2003).     
Inheritance practices in these areas see the main productive assets of a household passed 
down to male heirs. Additionally, sons are inherently fixed within the social order of a household 
whereas daughters are expected to join their husband’s household after marriage. Daughters 
spend less of their life contributing to the household of their parents than sons and can become a 
drain on household finances if their dowry or wedding expenses are significant. Sons, however, 
are expected to care for parents as they age. In South Korea, the eldest son is expected to care not 
only for his parents but for his ancestors in the afterlife as well. These factors contribute to 
households valuing sons over daughters (Das Gupta et al. 2003; Jayachandran 2017).  
In the son preferring regions of the world, many fertility decisions made by couples are 
predicated on the ability to produce at least one male heir. Global trends in both implicit and 
explicit fertility preferences are falling in response to increased economic development. Due to 
these trends, as well as the fact that fertility preferences are lower in regions with historical 
plough agriculture, couples with strong son-preference have fewer overall chances to produce 
their desired number of male children. Unlike more fluid preferences for total fertility, son-bias as 
a social norm has proven to be remarkably inflexible over time, suggesting that economic 
development in and of itself is insufficient to ending pre-and post-natal discrimination against 
daughters (Jayachandran 2014; 2017). Jayachandran (2017) studies sex-composition preferences 
in India, showing that families that desire fewer children prefer a more male-skewed sex 
composition ratio than couples prefer to have more children.    
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A number of studies show that preferences for sons affect family composition outcomes. 
Families in historically plough-based societies, with their less egalitarian gender norms, are more 
likely to employ son-based stopping decisions in which they decide to quit having children only 
after the desired number of sons is attained (Jayachandran 2017; Krause et al. 2019; Yamaguchi 
1989). Families with daughters are likely to have more overall children, meaning fewer resources 
to go around – and fewer still for the girl children, as studies show that parental investment in 
boys tends to be higher than in girls (Basu & De Jong 2010; Rosenzweig & Shultz 1982; Yamaguchi 
1989). This is perhaps most evident in India where female child mortality is 43% higher than that 
of boys and is the highest among daughters with at least one older sister (Jayachandran 2015).   
Numerous studies have outlined adverse consequences of make-skewed sex ratios. The 
impact on marriage markets is one of the most explicit consequences. In a highly skewed marriage 
market, many men will have to wait longer to marry or not marry at all, with the poorest men 
likely to be the most impacted (Guilmoto 2007). While it may seem that the consequences of 
fewer total women compared to men is likely to raise the fortunes of women, it often results in 
more pressure on women to marry and to become mothers early, denying women the choice to 
wait longer to marry, remain single, further their education, join the labor force, and more 
(Guilmoto 2007; Hesketh 2001). Women are also at increased risk of violence and trafficking in 
societies with highly imbalanced sex ratios (Hudson & den Boer 2005). Studies have found a 
correlation between imbalanced sex ratios and more violence and crime in societies; however, it 
has not been shown to be causal. Researchers hypothesize that mechanisms behind this 
correlation are due to the fact that men who aren’t given the choice to marry are more at risk of 
marginalization, loneliness, and possible psychological problems (Diamond-Smith & Rudolph 
2018).  
 
 2.4   Conceptual Model & Contribution to the Literature  
The goal of this study is to use the plausibly exogenous variation in the sex of recently firstborn 
children to understand how the sex outcome of a birth changes preferences for total fertility and 
family composition. The natural experiment at the heart of this paper relies on the exogeneity of 
the sex of firstborn children. Sociologists have argued in favor of incorporating the sex of offspring 
when studying parental attitudes, and past social science studies have reliably shown that the sex 
of children can affect parental actions and preferences (Downey et al. 1994). Somville (2019) 
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shows that men with firstborn daughters are less likely to beat and strangle their partners than 
men with firstborn sons. Greenlee et al. (2018) demonstrate that fathers with daughters voted for 
Hillary Clinton at a higher rate in the 2016 US presidential election. Likewise, Glynn & Sen 
(2016), Washington (2008), and Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) find that sex of offspring effects 
their parents’ voting behavior.  
 The rest of this paper’s conceptual framework is tied together by economic literature on 
preference formation, fertility preferences, and determinants of the sex ratio. As discussed in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3, gender norms play an important role in the formation of fertility preferences 
and the bias for sons. Son-preference, like many cultural gender norms, has proven to be pervasive 
thanks to cultural transmission pathways that are robust even in the face of cultural mobility and 
generational changes (Alesina et al. 2013; Bisin & Verdier 2001; Kraus et al. 2019). As fertility 
preferences update following the birth of a first child, the surrounding cultural gender norms 
likely play a role in determining how preferences respond to the sex of firstborn children. Among 
cultures with less egalitarian gender norms and strong son preference, children of either sex are 
seen as much less substitutable than in more egalitarian societies.  
There are two existing theories as to how the sex of children influence parity progression. 
The first is that the sex of existing children will matter more in low fertility regimes in explaining 
subsequent births. The second is that the sex of children will matter more in places with more 
unequal gender norms (Gray & Evans 2004; Hank 2007; Pollard & Morgan 2002). The strength 
of this study lies in the opportunity to observe how fertility preferences update in response to the 
sex of firstborn children, and how differential fertility regimes and cultural gender norms play a 
role in the ways that these preferences change.  
Distilling the interaction between fertility, sex compositional preferences, and gender 
norms is important toward understanding both the reproductive choices people make as well as 
the formation of fertility preferences. To my knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the 
effects of sex outcome of first birth on fertility and sex composition preferences. My study 
contributes to the literature studying the ways in which the sex of offspring influences their 
parents’ behavior and preferences, as well as the bodies of literature on preference formation and 
norm transmission, specifically on the subject of fertility preference formation. Additionally, my 
study contributes to understanding determinants of total fertility and the sex ratio.  
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3.   Data & Methodology 
3.1   Data Sources  
I perform my empirical analysis using individual-level data from the Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS), which has been administered by USAID in over 90 developing countries since 1984. 
To date, the DHS `has performed seven phases of the survey, with many countries being 
represented in multiple phases. Surveys are collected from households at a country-representative 
level. Detailed demographic and health information is recorded on all men, women, and children 
of a household. In addition to the household questionnaire, women and men of reproductive age 
(generally 15 – 49) are interviewed for individual-level women’s and men’s questionnaires. 
The DHS women’s questionnaire includes a detailed birth history for each woman. Using 
this information, I was able to create sets of indicator variables for children born within the twelve 
months preceding the DHS survey, firstborn children born in this timeframe, as well as the 
firstborn children of either sex born within this timeframe. In my analysis, I specifically use the 
indicator for female children born in the year prior to the DHS survey. Because of the women’s 
dataset’s detailed birth history, I am able to run stratified regressions on women who have 
firstborn daughters not born within the twelve months preceding the DHS survey in order to see 
if the results hold over time. The women’s dataset includes responses from over 2.8 million 
women, about 100,000 of whom became mothers to a firstborn in the twelve months prior to being 
surveyed by DHS.   
The DHS also includes data available from the individual men’s questionnaire available for 
download. Unlike the DHS women’s questionnaire, the survey completed by men at the individual 
level includes far less information on their children. Men respond to questions regarding the total 
number of children they have had, the number of each sex, the number of children of each sex that 
have died, and the age of their most recent child given in single year increments. Using this 
information, I was able to construct a sample of men who have a single living child aged one or 
under, including indicator variables for firstborn daughters and firstborn sons. The men’s dataset 
includes observations from over 900,000 men, about 30,000 had a firstborn aged one or under at 
the time of the DHS survey.  
Data on country-level total fertility and sex ratios at birth are provided by the Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs at the UN. Using this data, I constructed samples of countries in 
order to test hypotheses regarding the impact of fertility levels and cultural gender norms on 
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fertility preferences. The countries included in each sample can be referenced in Appendix Table 
XX. Data on historical plough use was taken from a dataset constructed by Krause et al. (2019) 
and slightly adapt an equation from Alesina et al. (2013) to give a plough-intensity at the country-
level rather than the district-level. Their equation is as follows:  








The dummy variable 𝐼𝑒
𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ
 is equal to 0 if an ethnic group did not use the plough and 1 if the 
ethnic group did use the plough. 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑐  represents the number of individuals of an ethnicity (𝑒) 
living in each grid cell (𝑖) in country (𝑐). This number is divided by 𝑁𝑐, the total population of a 
country. The values of plough are continuous between {0, 1}. I have merged this data with my 
original DHS datasets at the country-level in order to test hypothesis (2) discussed above. 
 
3.2   Research Design  
My study is a natural experiment exploiting the sex of firstborn children as a source of exogenous 
variation. Taken together with the timing of the DHS survey in relation to first births, I am able 
to identify the marginal effect of having a son or having a daughter on how new parents update 
their fertility preferences. Thanks to the detailed birth history available in the women’s data, I am 
able to test whether or not these preferences hold over time. The DHS questionnaires for both 
women and men include the three following questions on fertility preferences: 
Question 1: How many total children would you prefer, irrespective of the number of children you 
already have?   
Question 2: How many boy children would you prefer, irrespective of the number of sons you 
already have?  
Question 3: How many girl children would you prefer, irrespective of the number of daughters you 
already have?  
Looking to the samples of women and men who have recently had their first child, I run empirical 
analysis to see if the answers given to the three fertility preference questions differ based upon the 
sex of the firstborn.  
Additionally, I am able to test two current theories surrounding parental sex preferences 
to see if they hold. These theories include that 1) the sex of existing children matter more in low 
fertility societies in explaining subsequent births, and 2) that the sex of children is more 
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important in less egalitarian cultures (Gray & Evans 2004; Hank 2007; Pollard & Morgan 2002). 
To test the first theory, I run various sub-analysis, including on countries with below and above-
average fertility levels, based upon the year 2000 world average of 2.7 children (UN 2019). To test 
the second theory, I run two separate analyses. Firstly, I use sex ratio at birth as a proxy for 
existing son-bias. I run analysis on countries with low, natural, and high sex ratios at birth, based 
upon the country-level averages over the years 2000-2005 (UN 2019). Secondly, I use historical 
plough use as a proxy for cultural gender norms and run samples on countries with historically 
high and low use of plough-based agriculture. The results provide insights into norm transmission 
and the formation of fertility preferences.   
 
3.3   Model Specifications  
I perform empirical analysis using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with fixed effects at the 
administrative district level interacted with month, and interview year level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the administrative district level. I chose an OLS model after ensuring my data stood 
up to various tests of normality, including ensuring that the regression residuals are normally 
distributed and conducting a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. My model specifications are as follows:  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝜌𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝛾𝑦 + 𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑦 
 
The dependent variable 𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑦 represents the fertility preferences of person i in administrative 
district d in year y in terms of their ideal number of total children, ideal number of boys, and ideal 
number of girls. The variable 𝛽𝑖𝑑𝑦 indicates if person i has a recently firstborn daughter by taking 
on the value 1 if an individual had a firstborn daughter and 0 if the individual had a firstborn son. 
Next, 𝜌𝑖𝑑𝑦  includes a vector of demographic controls including age, age at first birth, education 
measured in single years, a dummy for rural households, and a dummy for poor households 
constructed from the DHS wealth quintiles, with households in the bottom two quintiles 1 for 
poor and coded 0 otherwise. The model’s fixed effects are represented by 𝛿 and 𝛾. Additionally, 
because the DHS surveys at a country-representative level, and because some countries have been 
surveyed more than others, the respondents from certain countries make up a larger portion of 
my sample than those from less populous countries. In order to account for this, weighting was 





Possible limitations that I cannot account for in my identification strategy include sex selection, 
possible lack of reporting on miscarriages or stillbirths, and possible health effects that may vary 
by region and cause differential effects to female and male fetuses (Orzack et al. 2015). Sex 
selection is unlikely to be of concern in this study due to the fact that SRBs for first children 
generally fall into the “natural” range of 103 to 107 even in countries with strong son-preference 
(Anukriti et al. 2015; Bhalotra & Cochrane 2010; Zeng, et al., 1993). To ensure that sex selection 
was unlikely to introduce endogeneity, I tested the SRB of firstborn children using the women’s 
data for its detailed birth history. In my sample, the overall SRB for firstborn children is 106.4. 
Additional robustness checks explained further in my results section attempt to account for any 
possible sex-selection. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statistics on my variables of interest, as well as the control 
variables used in my regressions. In the women’s DHS sample as a whole (Table 1a), women on 
average want 3.77 children. Women’s preferred sex ratio for children is fairly even, with an average 
of 1.56 girls and 1.62 boys. Over 2.5 million women have answered the question regarding their 
preferred number of children, and slightly more than 2 million specified their preferred sex 
compositional preferences. This may explain the disparity between the total number of children 
desired and the number of specified boys and girls. Additionally, respondents could have 
preferences for a total number of sons and daughters and additional children of an unspecified 
sex. On average, the women in the DHS sample are close to 30 and were roughly 20 years old when 
they had their first child. They have a mean education duration of 5.58 years, 57% are members of 
rural households, and 33% are members of households in the bottom two quintiles of the DHS 
wealth index.  
 Descriptive statistics for women who are part of the recent first births sample, each having 
given birth to their first child within a year of being interviewed for the DHS survey, are visible in 
Table 1b. These women are demographically similar to the women’s DHS sample as a whole. 
Women with a recent birth were on average 20 years old at the time of birth. They have a mean 
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education duration of 6.39 year, 60% are members of rural households, and 34% are members of 
poor households. Two meaningful differences stand out: the women who have recently had their 
first child are 21 on average, which is substantially lower than the mean age of 30 in the general 
women’s sample. Additionally, women in the recent first births sample want on average 3.32 
children instead of the 3.77 for the overall sample. The mean difference in desired children of 0.45 
amounts to a relative difference of 13.5% fewer children.  
 Men in the DHS sample want on average 4.44 children, 1.78 girls and 2.13 boys (Table 2a). 
Compared to women who want only 0.06 more sons than daughters, men seem to have a stronger 
preference toward boy children and on average want 0.35, or 19.6%, more sons than daughters. 
Men in the sample are on average 31 years old and were 25 at the time of their first child ’s birth. 
They have an average of 7.17 years of education. About 59% are members of rural households and 
38% are members of poor households.  
 Meanwhile, the sample of men who have recently had their firstborn child are described 
in Table 2b. These men are also demographically similar to the men’s sample as a whole. Men with 
recent first births have 7.97 years of education on average, were close to 26 at the time of their first 
child’s birth and 27 at the time of the DHS survey. Men belonging to rural households make up 
61% of the sample, and men belonging to poor households make up 38% of the sample. Similar to 
the women’s first births sample, the ideal number of total children falls from 4.44 to 3.89 – a 
decrease of 0.55, or 14%, fewer children. 
 
4.2 Main Results 
Tables 3a and 3b show the regression results for the women’s and men’s recent first births samples. 
The coefficient represents the marginal effect of having a daughter, and due to the binary nature 
of the variable, the marginal effect of having a son would be the inverse of the coefficient. Columns 
(1) and (2) on each table show the marginal effect of having a daughter on total fertility 
preferences. Both before and after the vector of demographic controls are added in, women want 
0.03 more children conditional on having a daughter. This is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. For men, the marginal effect of having a daughter is desiring about 0.058 more children. This 
is not statistically significant; though it is directionally positive. It appears that both men and 
women want more overall children after having a firstborn daughter and fewer children after 
having a firstborn son.  
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 Columns (3) and (4) show the women’s and men’s results for ideal number of girls. 
Conditional on having a firstborn daughter, women prefer 0.09 more daughters both before and 
after the vector of demographic controls, statistically significant at a 1% level. Men prefer 0.094 
more girl children before demographic controls are added to the regression and 0.087 more 
daughters following the addition of demographic controls, likewise significant at a 1% level. For 
both men and for women, the marginal effect of having a daughter appears to be a bias for more 
girl children. Likewise, having a son appears to decrease the number of girl children individuals 
prefer.  
 Columns (5) and (6) report the regression results for ideal number of preferred boys. Both 
before and after the addition of demographic controls, women prefer 0.04 fewer boy children 
conditional on having a firstborn daughter. This is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Meanwhile, men show almost no change in the number of boy children they want following the 
recent birth of a daughter. A possible explanation for this difference is that son preference among 
men is stronger and more inelastic than that of women, and therefore the sex of their first child 
does not alter their preferences. Both sexes show a similar response toward having a girl as a first 
child, which results in a preference for about 0.09 more girl children. It is possible that for both 
sexes, preferences for daughters are more elastic. Women also show a significant change in the 
number of boys they prefer based upon the sex of their firstborn, suggesting that women’s sex 
compositional preferences are more prone to update based upon the sex of her first child.   
 Looking to Figures 1a and 1b, which show the results for ideal number of children at a 
country level, it is evident that the sex of firstborn children results heterogeneous preference 
responses. The figures show the mean percentage difference in number of children preferred 
conditional on the sex of recently firstborn children for both the women’s and the men’s samples. 
Pink indicates countries in which first-time parents on average prefer more children conditional 
on having a firstborn daughter, while the countries shaded green indicate parents prefer more 
children conditional on having a firstborn son. The darker the color, the stronger the effect. 
Consistent with the regression results, both the women’s and the men’s maps have more pink 
countries than green, indicating it is more common overall for individuals to want more overall 
children if they have a firstborn daughter rather than a firstborn son.  
 The heterogeneous results suggest that socio-cultural factors influence both the formation 
of fertility preferences as well as how people’s preferences update conditional on the sex of their 
first child. Notably, countries in Africa’s matrilineal belt (Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) are 
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shaded green in Figure 1a showing the women’s results. Due to the practice of female land 
inheritance, perhaps having a daughter as a first child means women then feel less of a need to 
have additional children in order to produce an heir.  
Additionally, while the majority of countries appear to see women and men with 
directionally similar preference updates, a number of countries do not. In Brazil, for example, 
women want up to 5% more children if their child is male and men want 5-10% more children if 
their first child is female. Similar patterns can be witnessed Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ukraine, 
Cambodia, Madagascar, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, the opposite pattern 
can also be seen in which women appear to desire more children if their first child is female, while 
men desire more children if their first child is male. The strongest example of this is Kazakhstan, 
in which women want up to 5% more overall children if they have a firstborn daughter, yet men 
want 10-15% more children if their firstborn is male. This pattern is also evident to a lesser degree 
in Bangladesh, Albania, Azerbaijan, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ghana, Mali and Togo.  
 
 4.3   Differential Fertility Countries 
The differential effects visible in Figures 1a and 1b suggest that socio-cultural elements effect how 
the sex of firstborn children impacts parents’ fertility preferences. According to theories on 
parental sex preferences, the sex of existing children should matter more in low fertility societies 
in explaining successive births (Gray & Evans 2004; Hank 2007; Pollard & Morgan 2002). In high 
fertility countries, couples have a higher probability of naturally attaining their desired sex 
composition of children than couples in low fertility countries, making the impact of the sex of 
existing children among couples who desire fewer overall children of higher import.  
In order to understand more about how average fertility levels impact and are influenced 
by the sex of first children, I created subsamples of countries with below average and above 
average fertility based on year 2000 total fertility averages. Countries with total fertility rates at 
or below the global average of 2.7 children were included in the “low fertility” subsample and 
countries with total fertility rates above 2.7 were included in the “high fertility” subsample. Like 
the regressions explained in Section 4.1, only those parents with recent firstborns were included 
in my regressions in order to best identify the marginal effect of having a firstborn daughter versus 
having a firstborn son.  
The women’s results can be seen in Table 4a for low fertility countries and Table 4b for 
high fertility countries. In high fertility countries the marginal effect of having a female first child 
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is a desire for 0.035 more children, significant at the 10% level. Among low fertility countries, 
however, the desired number of total children for women with a firstborn daughter appears to 
change very slightly, if at all. However, when it comes to ideal number of girl children, women in 
both the low and high fertility subsamples appear to have their preferences change based upon 
the sex of their firstborn child. Women in high fertility countries desire a highly significant 0.085 
more girl children, while women in low fertility countries want 0.109 more girls. Both are 
significant at the 1% level. Lastly, conditional on having a female first child, women in high fertility 
countries want 0.034 fewer boys and women in low fertility countries want 0.067 fewer boys, 
both significant at the 5% level. While the sex compositional preference changes among women 
in low fertility countries are already stronger than for women in high fertility countries, these 
changes are also of a larger magnitude considering the average number of preferred children is 
smaller in low fertility countries.  
The men’s results for low fertility countries can be seen in Table 5a and the results for high 
fertility countries can be seen in Table 5b. Though the change is not statistically significant, men 
in high fertility countries appear to prefer more overall children conditional having a recently 
firstborn daughter. The regression coefficient is 0.13 with a standard error of 0.1, suggesting a 
directionally positive change with wide variation. Similar to women in low fertility countries, men 
in this subsample also see an insignificant and miniscule change in the total number of preferred 
children. When it comes to the sex composition of children, men in high fertility countries want 
0.096 more daughters, conditional on having a firstborn daughter, though the coefficient is not a 
statistically significant. Meanwhile, men in low fertility countries want a highly statistically 
significant 0.078 more daughters. Neither sample of men show a statistically significant change in 
the number of boys preferred; however, men in high fertility countries show a directionally 
positive change conditional on having a recent firstborn daughter while men in low fertility 
countries show a directionally negative change.  
The results from both the women’s and the men’s subsample suggest that preferences for 
total number of children are more elastic among those in high fertility countries where we see 
women’s preferences changes by 0.035 depending on the sex of a firstborn and men’s preferences 
change by somewhere in the range of 0.03 to 0.23. Meanwhile, the sex compositional preferences 
of women and men shift more in low-fertility countries. This is especially true among preferences 
for girls, which goes up by a highly significant 0.078 for men and 0.109 for women when their 
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firstborn is female. This finding is consistent with the theory that sex of children should matter 
more in low fertility societies.   
 
 4.4   Differential Gender Norm Countries 
As discussed in Section 2, gender norms play a substantial role in how fertility preferences are 
formed. They likely also play a role in how fertility preferences update depending on the sex of 
one’s first child. In countries with less egalitarian gender norms, sons and daughters are seen as 
less substitutable than in countries with more egalitarian norms. I test the effect of differential 
gender norms on fertility preferences in two ways: using country-level SRBs as a proxy for existing 
son-preference and using historical plough use as a proxy for egalitarian gender norms.  
 According to the WHO, the “natural” sex ratio at birth is between roughly 103-107 boys 
born for every 100 females, due to varying the mortality levels of fetuses of each sex during 
pregnancy. Using data from the UN, I created subsamples of countries that over the years 2000-
2005 had average sex ratios at birth below the natural level (low SRB), in the natural range 
(natural SRB) and above the natural range (high SRB). A breakdown of each sample can be found 
in Table XX.  
 The regression results for the women’s regressions on regressions on the low, natural, and 
highly skewed SRB subsamples can be found in Tables 6a, 6b, and 6c. None of the samples return 
statistically significant results for a shift in the ideal number of total children based on the sex of 
firstborn children. However, the low SRB sample does have a directionally negative coefficient of 
-0.015, while the natural and high SRB samples have directionally positive coefficients of 0.045 
and 0.33, respectively. Each sample has a highly statistically significant coefficient between 0.09 
and 0.107 for ideal number of girls following the birth of a firstborn daughter. Meanwhile, the low 
SRB sample has a coefficient of -0.044, significant at the 10% level, for ideal number of boys 
following the recent birth of a firstborn daughter. The natural SRB sample sees a directionally 
similar coefficient of -0.073, significant at the 1% level. The high SRB sample, however, has a 
positive coefficient of 0.007 that is not statistically significant.  
 The regression results for the men’s regressions on the low, natural, and highly skewed 
SRB subsamples can be found in Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c. Among the men’s samples for ideal number 
of children, men in both the low and the natural SRB samples have directionally negative 
following the birth of a firstborn daughter. This coefficient is -0.135 for the low SRB sample and -
0.054 for the natural SRB sample. Meanwhile, the high SRB sample has a coefficient of 0.083. None 
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of these coefficients are statistically significant, though they are directionally interesting given 
what the sex ratio tells us about the existing son-bias within these countries. For the ideal number 
of girls, all three samples have directionally positive coefficients; however, the high SRB sample 
has the largest coefficient at 0.1 and is the only statistically significant coefficient. As for ideal 
number of boys, both the low and the natural samples have large and statistically significant 
preference changes based upon the sex of firstborn children. Men with a firstborn daughter prefer 
0.216 fewer boys in the low SRB sample, and 0.123 fewer boys in the natural SRB sample. However, 
men with firstborn daughters in the high SRB sample appear to prefer more sons. The coefficient 
on this result is 0.044, though it is not statistically significant.   
 The second method I used to test the influence of gender norms on fertility preference 
changes is historical use of plough-based agriculture. Studies show that historical use of the 
plough resulted in less egalitarian gender norms, and that these norms are persistent in the present 
day compared with regions that practiced other agricultural methods (Alesina et al. 2011, 2013; 
Krause et al. 2019). The measure I used for historical plough use is a continuous variable along the 
interval [0, 1], based on the percentage of a country’s population with ancestors who practiced 
plough-based agriculture. Similarly to previous papers that have relied on this variable, I’ve added 
countries with 0.85 and above to a “high plough use” subsample, and countries with 0.15 and 
below to a “low plough use” subsample. The regression results for the high and low plough use 
samples can be found in Tables 8 for the women’s subsamples and Table 9 for the men’s 
subsamples. 
 For women with firstborn daughters, both the low plough and high plough use 
subsamples have similar, non-statistically significant effects for their ideal number of children. 
The low plough use subsample has a coefficient of 0.022 and the high plough use subsample has a 
coefficient of 0.025. Likewise, for ideal number of girls, both women’s subsamples have parallel 
results: conditional on having a firstborn female, women in low plough use countries prefer 0.098 
more girl children, and women in high plough use countries prefer 0.083 more daughters, both 
significant at the 1% level. However, when it comes to the preferred ideal number of boys after 
having a firstborn daughter, the two samples differ. Women in the low plough use subsample 
desire a highly statistically significant 0.083 fewer boys, whereas women in the high plough use 
subsample desire 0.023 fewer boys, though this coefficient is not statistically significant. While it 
appears that preferences for ideal number of girls is affected based on the sex of firstborn children, 
and therefore more elastic, a similar elasticity in preferences for boys is only evident in the low 
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plough use sample. It is possible that the high plough use sample has a stronger and less elastic 
preference for boys overall, given that less egalitarian gender norms in these countries mean that 
girl children and boy children are seen as less substitutable.  
 Among the men’s samples, neither the high plough use nor low plough use subsample see 
a statistically significant change in ideal number of children after having a recent firstborn 
daughter. However, the coefficient of -0.027 is negative in the low plough use subsample and the 
coefficient of 0.09 is positive in the high plough use subsample. When it comes to ideal number 
of daughters, men with firstborn daughters in the low plough use subsample see almost no change 
in the desired number of daughters, whereas men in the high plough use subsample desire a highly 
significant 0.108 more daughters. These results nearly swap when it comes to ideal number of 
boys. In low plough use countries, men want 0.119 fewer boys, significant at the 5% level, if they’ve 
had a firstborn daughter, while the number of boys does not change a statistically significant 
amount based on the sex of the firstborn child. Among men in the low plough use sample, it seems 
that preferences for girl children are more elastic than preferences for boy children. Notably, many 
of the countries in the low plough use sample overlap with countries with below natural SRB 
which perhaps signals some degree of daughter-preference. Meanwhile, similarly to the women’s 
high plough sample, we see an elastic preference for daughters and a static preference for sons.  
 Based upon the results for both the various SRB samples and the differential plough use 
samples, it does appear that gender norms play a large role in how fertility preferences are updated 
following the birth of a firstborn and based upon the sex of that firstborn. In countries where sons 
are preferred, we see more a more elastic preference for daughters and a less elastic preference for 
sons. In these countries, individuals are also likely to want more overall children conditional on 
having a daughter, perhaps signaling that they feel as if they must have more children in order to 
have a son. This is consistent with the theory that sex of children matters more in less egalitarian 
societies where children of either sex are seen as less substitutable by their parents and the wider 
culture.  
 
 4.5   Further Robustness Checks 
I ran a series of checks in order to ensure the robustness of my findings and to account as much as 
possible for any limitations to my identification strategy. Firstly, I ran regressions on a women’s 
and a men’s subsample excluding India. While the majority of empirical evidence suggests that 
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individuals do not use sex selection on their first children, anecdotal accounts suggests that some 
couples in India engage in first child sex selection if they only want one child. Additionally, India 
represents the largest number of respondents in the DHS data, making up a good portion of both 
the men’s and the women’s samples; by excluding India I am also able to check to see if data from 
India has an outsized effect on my findings. The results for the women’s and men’s subsamples 
excluding India can be found in Appendix Table A.1.  
For the women’s sample, the results are similar in magnitude to the main women’s results 
in Table 3a. In the subsample excluding India, women’s preferences for ideal number of children 
change by 0.028 dependent on the sex of her firstborn, while women’s preferences for girl children 
go up by 0.078 and preferences for boys go down by 0.066. The sex composition preferences are 
significant at the 1% level, while the preferences for ideal number of children are not statistically 
significant, though they are similar in magnitude to the sample as a whole. Notably, respondents 
from India account for the largest portion of DHS responses, and therefore the largest single 
country included in my sample of women who had their first birth within twelve months of the 
DHS survey. It is conceivably that the smaller sample size accounts for the loss of significance on 
that coefficient.  
 For the men’s subsample excluding India, the results are also directionally similar to the 
main results in Table 3b. The marginal effect of having a firstborn female child results in men 
desiring more overall children, and similarly main results this number is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient in the subsample excluding India is slightly higher at 0.117. The 
subsample also has a similar preference for more girls, conditional on the birth of a firstborn 
daughter, with a coefficient of 0.105 significant at the 5% level. Mirroring the main men’s results, 
men’s preferences for their ideal number of boys does not change a significant amount based on 
the sex of their firstborn child. It appears that neither the large representation of respondents 
from India nor the possible sex selection used among first time parents of that country appear to 
have an effect on my overall findings for women or for men.  
 Due to more detailed birth histories collected by the DHS in their women’s questionnaire, 
I am also able to run two additional checks of robustness on the women’s sample. The DHS 
women’s survey includes a question inquiring as to whether a woman has had a pregnancy that 
did not result in a live birth. They do not inquire further into whether this is due to miscarriage, 
stillbirth, or abortion. In order to comprehensively account for any possible sex selective 
abortions, I ran a regression on a subsample of women excluding those who answered yes to this 
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question, which can be found in Appendix Table A.2. The results are very similar in magnitude to 
the main women’s results in Table 3a. For ideal number of children, women in this subsample 
prefer 0.027 more if they’ve had a firstborn daughter, significant at the 10% level. When it comes 
to their ideal number of girls, women prefer 0.091 more conditional on having a firstborn daughter. 
Lastly, women with a recent firstborn daughter prefer 0.038 fewer boys. Both the coefficients on 
ideal number of girls and ideal number of boys are significant at the 1% level. Ultimately, it does 
not appear that having any number of previous pregnancies not result in a live birth significantly 
change my findings.  
 Finally, due to the more detailed birth history from women, I was able to see if the results 
of the sex of a recent firstborn are similar or different from the longer-term effects of the sex of 
firstborn children. In order to check the longer-term effects of having a firstborn daughter, I ran a 
regression on a sample of women who are parents to one or more children, but who have not had 
a birth in the past twelve months. The results can be found in Appendix Table A.3. The results are 
similar in both magnitude and significance. Women who have a firstborn daughter prefer 0.031 
more overall children, 0.111 more girl children, and 0.075 fewer boy children, all significant at the 
1% level. While the marginal effect of having a daughter on total number of children is identical 
to the recent first births sample, the sample exploring the longer-term effects appear to have 
slightly stronger effects when it comes to sex composition. These results provide evidence of the 
long-term effect that the sex of one’s firstborn child has on future fertility preferences.  
 
5. Conclusion 
My findings suggest that the sex of first children plays a role in determining preferences for total 
fertility, as well as preferred numbers of sons and daughters. Not only do the results show new 
parents updating their fertility preferences ex post facto, these updated preferences seem to hold 
over time. The strongest effect seen in my study is on both women’s and men’s preferences for 
ideal number of girls, which between 0.09 to 0.1 conditional on having a firstborn daughter. 
Overwhelmingly, both men and women also want more children on average after having a 
firstborn daughter and fewer children on average after having a firstborn son. However, it is 
unclear if the result of preferring more children is an effect of wanting more girl children after 
having a daughter or an effect of desiring more children overall in order to have a son. More 
research is ultimately necessary in order to fully understand this effect.  
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 Moreover, I am able to test the two existing hypotheses concerning the interaction of 
parity progression with fertility regimes or gender norms. I find evidence to support both existing 
theories. I show that sex compositional preferences change more dependent on the sex of firstborn 
children in low fertility contexts. It also seems that cultural gender norms play a role in the ways 
that individuals respond to the sex of their firstborn child.  
 Multiple competing or interdependent mechanisms may be at play behind these results. I 
find evidence of less elastic son preference among both women and men, with men’s preferences 
for sons appearing to be the most inelastic. Meanwhile, changes of higher magnitude and greater 
statistical significance are found for daughter preferences among both women and men. These 
findings indicate a relative flexibility in preferences for girls and inflexibility in preferences for 
boys. This result hardly comes as a surprise given the prevalence of son-preference around the 
world, as well as supporting what we know about intergenerational preference transmission. 
Additionally, some sort of retrospective or confirmation biases could be behind these updated 
preferences: parents who felt indifferent, or even negative, toward the idea of having a girl might 
feel otherwise following the birth of a daughter. Future research could attempt to disambiguate 
these potential mechanisms.  
 Ultimately, my findings suggest that both total fertility as well as sex compositional 
preferences update over the course of one’s life. The sex of an individual’s first child, in conjunction 
with becoming a parent, plays a role in determining how these preferences update, and these 
changes do appear to hold over time. Cultural norms regarding total fertility levels and gender 
roles likewise govern preference responses to the sex of first children. It is my hope that 
understanding more about fertility preference formation can guide future research and policies 
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Figure 1: Country-Level Total Fertility Preferences  
 
Figure 1a: Women’s Country-Level Total Fertility Preferences 
 
 









































Table A.4: List of Countries and their Subsample Inclusions  
Country Fertility Level 
Subsample 




Afghanistan High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Albania Low fertility >107 High plough use 
Angola High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Armenia Low fertility >107 High plough use 
Azerbaijan Low fertility >107 Low plough use 
Bangladesh High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Benin High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Bolivia High fertility 103-107 N/A 
Brazil Low fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Burkina Faso High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Burundi High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Central African Republic High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Cambodia High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Cameroon High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Chad High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Colombia Low fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Comoros High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Republic of Congo High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Democratic Republic of Congo High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Côte d’Ivoire High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Dominican Republic High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Ecuador High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Egypt High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
El Salvador High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Eswatini High fertility <103 High plough use 
Ethiopia High fertility 103-107 N/A 
Gabon High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Ghana High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Guatemala High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Guinea High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Guyana High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Haiti High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Honduras High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
 46 
India High fertility >107 High plough use 
Indonesia Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Jordan High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Kazakhstan Low fertility 103-107 N/A 
Kenya High fertility <103 N/A 
Kyrgyzstan Low fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Lesotho High fertility >107 High plough use 
Liberia High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Madagascar High fertility >107 Low plough use 
Malawi High fertility >107 Low plough use 
Maldives High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Mali High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Mexico Low fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Moldova Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Morocco High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Mozambique High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Namibia High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Nepal High fertility >107 High plough use 
Nicaragua High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Niger High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Nigeria High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Pakistan High fertility >107 High plough use 
Paraguay High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Peru High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Philippines High fertility 103-107 N/A 
Rwanda High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Sao Tome Principe High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Senegal High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Sierra Leone High fertility <103 Low plough use 
South Africa High fertility 103-107 N/A 
Sri Lanka Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Sudan High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Tanzania High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Thailand Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Timor-Leste High fertility 103-107 N/A 
Togo High fertility <103 Low plough use 
 47 
Trinidad and Tobago Low fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Tunisia Low fertility >107 High plough use 
Turkey Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Uganda High fertility <103 Low plough use 
Ukraine Low fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Uzbekistan Low fertility 103-107 N/A 
Vietnam Low fertility >107 High plough use 
Yemen High fertility 103-107 High plough use 
Zambia High fertility 103-107 Low plough use 
Zimbabwe High fertility <103 Low plough use 
 
